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INTRODUCTION
Why should investors still be interested in Italy? With the
collapse of some of the biggest Italian corporations, like Alitalia and
Ilva, now is the time to rethink the role of foreign investments in the
country. This Article seeks to demonstrate the suitability of
regulations for establishing a restructuring plan, specifically
targeting those regulations meant to harmonize market prerogatives
with public interests during a time of economic crisis. In particular,
this Article explores the interplay between corporate contingencies
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and the role of the public administration in the pursuit of a dynamic
governance strategy for the Italian economic system using the
inductive method.1
Recent reforms in the Italian insolvency regulatory
framework, with ongoing amendments on restructuring plans, have
created momentum for a reorganization of domestic corporate
strategies vis-à-vis investor demands. Drawing lessons from the
Italian experience, this Article challenges traditional ways of
approaching bankruptcy proceedings and offers a contextually richer
understanding the advantages to restructuring plans.
A restructuring plan in the Italian domestic legal system
through a ‘forward-looking’ strategy aims to achieve a fresh start for
debtors’ business affairs. As a result, the advantages to undertake a
restructuring plan is that an economic balance can be preserved
through a less formal and more flexible tool as opposed to judicial
intervention, which is typical in bankruptcy procedures. In this fashion,
the restructuring plan could encourage broader state engagement in times
of economic crisis, aiming to promptly and effectively address market
prerogatives and public interests.
This study will shed light on the way the Italian business
reorganization process is aimed at fostering growth and economic
stability. Determining how a new legal framework could attract
foreign investment is key to assessing success in the Italian model.
In this respect, not only may restructuring plans serve as a basis for
1

The inductive method represents a preferred theory in contemporary
international law. See William Thomas Worster, The Inductive and Deductive
Methods in Customary Internationa lLaw Analysis: Traditional and Modern
Approaches, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 445 (2014). This method aims to garner
inferences from particular events, acts, or phenomena in order to derive a general
rule. Whether it is impossible to draw verdicts on the inferences that were
ascertained, the validity of the conclusion lies on the quality of evidence used to
support it. See John Vickers, The Problem of Induction§ 2, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., rev. ed. 2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/. In order to provide adequate
and genuine evidence, the Article takes into account emblematic cases of
corporate contingencies with regard to the Italian economic system, in order to
support the analysis on restructuring models.
38

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

economic revival, but also as a bulwark for social protection.
I. Background
A. Restructuring Plans: A ‘Forward-looking’ Model
Restructuring plans represent a concrete legal tool for public
intervention in the economy. These plans not only aim at preserving
the productive body of the corporation, but also ensure job security
in order to promote economic equilibrium.2 The management of the
ongoing economic crisis would be best taken out through these
‘forward-looking’ models, which have two central goals. On one
hand, such a model aims at promoting continuity in business activity
through the attraction of foreign direct investment (“FDI”). On the
other hand, it fosters built-in defenses for the domestic system
through the recovery of production capacity and social protection,
which ultimately support job security. As a result, forward-looking
restructuring plans support national and international core business
goals while also creating a fertile legal and administrative ground
for foreign investors.
Restructuring is one strategy for corporations to avoid a total
termination of their business, while also achieving economic
continuity in the market. This is a public policy that aims to mitigate
economic and social consequences, while negotiating different
positions taken by investors and owners that hold company equity,
as well as lenders and creditors who control debt. The rationale is to
provide an effective and prompt solution to an emergency in the
corporate condition.3
The restructuring process entails radical reforms in a
2

See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS, 433 (6th ed., 2015) (analyzing restructuring plans in
bankruptcy as a creative corporate finance tool, posing as an alternative to
liquidation).
3
Colin Anderson & David Morrison, The Commencement of the Company
Rescue: How and when does it start?, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW:
THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES, 83, 83–85 (Paul J. Omar ed., 2008) (analyzing the
rise of the so-called “rescue culture” and the determination of a rescue regime in
insolvency procedure).
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corporation’s organization and structure in order to address serious
financial and operational issues that could lead to shut down or
liquidation. During this process, the organization’s ownership
changes and new contractual relationships are formed with
creditors, debt holders, shareholders, employees, and other
stakeholders. Ideally, restructuring will lead to the creation of
businesses that are more likely to attract FDI with sound policy and
regulatory framework supporting them. This ultimately revives the
corporation to be a productive and profitable entity. Policymakers
have struggled with large corporate business crises, as they hold an
endemic risk tied to industry and large-scale unemployment. In
other words, this is a public policy problem that needs to be
addressed with appropriate legal tools, driven by flexibility and
urgency.
Despite their relevance, restructuring plans have hardly been
implemented through organic domestic regulation in response to a
major corporate business crisis. Instead, such situations have
historically been deferred to ad hoc laws for singular enterprises
about to collapse. Both the rationale and effects of restructuring
plans, with regard to 2007-8 global economic crisis, have rarely been
the subject of research by international scholars. Within this
framework, a “rescue culture” has emerged as demonstrated by the
recent guidelines on insolvency authored by UNCITRAL and the
World Bank.4
The traditional legal instruments that have dealt with business
crises are grounded in bankruptcy law, which defers to the judiciary
to determine the competence of the corporation’s dismissal. Threats
of another global economic crisis establish the need for different
responses, as well as more effective and prompt solutions. In this
4

See IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 500–503
(2d dd., 2005) (on the quest for international standards and principles in
insolvency procedures, set out by the major international institutions, as
UNCITRAL or the World Bank in 1999); see also TERENCE C. HALLIDAY &
BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC
FINANCIAL CRISIS 96–112 (2009) (analyzing the role of International Financial
Institutions in developing a global regulation on bankruptcy for national
insolvency systems).
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light, domestic policymakers are resorting to new legal instruments
like restructuring plans in order to provide corporate executives a
stronger role and, in turn, with an augmented power of intervention
in domestic markets. Indeed, since financial insolvencies trigger
economic and social alarms, it is paramount for governmental
authorities to provide quick and prompt answers at the disposal of
large corporations.5
B. The ‘Domino Effect’
The problem of the financial instability of large corporations
is usually intertwined with cyclical economic crises. As a result,
sovereign states have typically faced the issue of relying on ad hoc
laws in order to intervene in a particular industry or for a particular
corporation.6 As the global financial crisis spread around the world,
governments have grappled with the idea of establishing general
regulations for corporate restructuring. Not only would a general
domestic regulation further an economic purpose in the realm of
public policy, but it would also tackle the social side effects
embedded in the crisis.7
With public interests at stake, the intervention of government
entities is necessary for complete economic recovery and the
safeguarding of social values. In fact, contingencies of large
corporations trigger significant repercussions, almost like a domino
effect. The crisis generates an economic breakdown amplified with
effects on all the ancillary activities and subsidiaries of such large
multinational corporations.8 Additionally, the crisis produces severe
5

See, e.g., RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL ET AL., DEBT RESTRUCTURING 36
(2011) (analyzing the legal framework of restructuring plans); see also Christine
M. Cumming, Managing Crises Without Government Guarantees: How Do We
Get There?, in OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2011, No. 2 (2012), 157 (analyzing the role of government in managing the financial crisis).
6
See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 137–139 (on the evolution of insolvency
regulation in private international law, from the sphere of natural persons to
business corporations).
7
See GERARD MCCORMACK, CORPORATE RESCUE LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE 209 (2008).
8
See Jongho Kim, Corporate Restructuring Through Spin-Off Reorganization
Plan: A Korean Case Study, 23 PACE INT'L L. REV. 41, 43 (2011).
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societal dilemmas, the most salient of which being unemployment.9
Therefore, the countless consequences of large corporate crises are
the issue motivating policy-makers find holistic economic and social
policy solutions for these large-scale economic problems.10
C. Dichotomy Between
Bankruptcy Procedures

Restructuring

Plans

and

The distinction between bankruptcy procedures and
restructuring plans lies within the rationale of each method. While
the former is oriented to provide credit protection, the latter is
focused on business continuity. For example, bankruptcy regulation
is primarily based on credit protection and only through composition
with creditors, it allows for the continuation of the business activity.
Restructuring plans on the other hand, utilize economic and social
safeguards with the expulsion of the executive management from
the business entity, to help deliver a revitalized organization to new
investors.11 In this framework, analyzing the experience of the U.S.
legal system, through the standards embedded in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, may serve as an
example to point out the main features and differences between
bankruptcy procedures and restructuring plans.
Bankruptcy procedure is a legal mechanism purely based on
liquidating the corporation in a solvency crisis. Interpretation of the
meaning of crisis can range from temporary difficulties to a full state
of insolvency. It aims to completely dismantle the enterprise,
through the sale of its assets and with the consequent banishment of
the corporation from the market. These procedures are designed to

9

See e.g., LAURA HORN, REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EU:
TOWARDS A MARKETIZATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL 168–69 (2012).
10
See Anderson & Morrison, supra note 3, at 87–90 (analyzing the discipline of
companies rescue through a comparative perspective, shedding light on the
British, Australian, and American systems).
11
See Daniel Hayek, Christina Meyer & Chantal Joris, Restructuring over
Liquidation, 48 INT’L FIN. L. REV., 48, 48–51 (2015) (analyzing the dual choice
between restructuring and liquidating corporations in distress).
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seek protection for creditors.12
Bankruptcy agreements consist of a negotiation settlement, in
which the decision to continue the business activity is not imposed
by law, but is left to the parties involved to determine. In other
words, the balance between liquidation and continuation is a private
decision once the status of liability is settled. In the latter case,
parties shall demonstrate that continuation is practical to the
satisfaction of creditors.13
Regulation for restructuring plans take a completely different
approach. For example, protection of the production system along
with the continuity of business prevail over the interests of the
creditors. Therefore, through a reconciliation of the interests at
stake, the liquidation of corporate assets is mitigated with an eye
towards market prerogatives and other public needs.
Restructuring plan regulations also have a special procedure
in which domestic policymakers tend to balance the interests at stake
while prioritizing the preservation of the business entity. To be
found eligible under the restructuring plan regulations, the
enterprise must be in a state of insolvency. In this situation,
insolvency is defined as a non-transitory state in which the
entrepreneur is unable to regularly fulfill corporate obligations.14
Once the enterprise is found to be eligible, the plan can be activated
through different scenarios; either as a result of the failure of private
negotiations, or as a default provision. However, private agreements
are not always sufficient to grant a business continuation of the

12

Harry Rajak, The Culture of Bankruptcy 3, 17–25, in INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY LAW supra note 3 (analyzing bankruptcy regulation through a
comparative perspective, describing the evolution of the British and the
American systems).
13
See generally GAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 433 (analyzing when bankruptcy is
the best option); see also CHRISTOPHER A. WARD, ET AL., AMERICAN
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, THE CHIEF RESTRUCTURING OFFICER’S GUIDE TO
BANKRUPTCY: VIEWS FROM LEADING INSOLVENCY PROFESSIONALS 10 (2013).
14
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, ET AL., A GLOBAL VIEW OF BUSINESS INSOLVENCY
SYSTEMS 65 (2010) (analyzing liquidation procedures and the role of liquidators
in domestic systems from a comparative perspective).
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enterprise.15
In conclusion, external and internal considerations must be
taken into account during large economic crises that negatively
impact major business entities. If the business executives lose their
legitimacy or credibility, or if they are no longer willing to continue
managing the enterprise, then it is the role of the country’s
regulatory system to intervene through a restructuring plan to
protect the public interests at stake. In other words, restructuring
regulations are a set of domestic policies that preserve productivity
and employment stability, while maintaining the balance between
the interests of all the relevant stakeholders, not solely creditors.16
The framework created thus far demonstrates how restructuring
plans can re-establish the economic balance of corporations in crisis,
and how tailored regulatory frameworks can attract FDI into
domestic systems.

II. Analysis
A. The Italian System
The regulation of restructuring plans has a long tradition in the
Italian system, where it has been regulated for nearly forty years
with different models being adopted over that time period. In recent
times, such regulation caught the attention of investors worldwide,
as the financial crisis triggered new challenges for the Italian
economic system.17 The cases of ILVA and Alitalia, considered
amongst the largest domestic Italian corporations, demonstrate the
15

See MCCORMACK supra note 7, at 251.
See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN
BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 812 (4th ed., 2012).
17
See Tiziana Del Prete & Matteo Smacchi, Italy, in THE RESTRUCTURING
REVIEW, 152, 152 (Cristopher Mallon ed., 7th ed., 2014); see e.g., Stefania
Pacchi Pescucci, L’amministrazoine Straordinaria delle Imprese di Rilevanti
Dimensioni [Restructuring Plans of Large Corporations], in TRATTATO DI
DIRITTO DELLE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, 833, 833 (U. Apice ed., 2011); see
also Vittorio Zanichelli, L’amministrazione Straordinaria [The Restructuring
Plans], in FALLIMENTO E ALTRE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, 2010, 2074
(Giuseppe Fauceglia & Luciano Panzani, eds., 2009).
16
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need for an effective policy and regulatory framework on
restructuring plans. After analyzing the evolution of the Italian
system, this Article will focus on current reforms, which are deemed
necessary to create a sound framework for attracting FDI into Italy.
B. The Italian Regulatory Framework
In 1979, the Italian Parliament introduced for the first time a
regulation on business crises of large corporations.18 In order to
make it compatible with the European Union framework on
competition law in the late 1990s, the regulation underwent a
revision process. On June 17, 1999 the European Court of Justice
found the Italian law incompatible with European standards and
specifically, with the regime on competition and state aid.19 The EU
system does not allow automatic state aid, especially without any
sort of distinction between meritorious and unworthy enterprises.
Following the Court’s ruling on compliance with the EU legal
framework on competition, Italy further revised the regulatory
system with Legislative Decree no. 270 in 1999.20 This was the socalled “Prodi” procedure, named after Minister Romano Prodi.
With this reform, Italy opted for a model that required reliance on
the judiciary to administer the plan.21 Italian courts were then
pressed to decide, whether the application of the Prodi procedure
was compliant with the already existing restructuring regulatory
system. The Italian Constitutional Court affirmed that the new
procedure was compliant and that governmental authorities should
both implement and manage the restructuring plan.22
18

The first regulation on restructuring plans for large enterprises was adopted
with the Law Decree 30 January 1979, n. 26 – converted with modifications into
the Law no. 953 of 3 April 1979. See Decreto Legge 3 aprile 1979, n.95, G.U.
Apr. 4, 1979, n.94 (It.).
19
Case C-295/97, Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio SpA v.
International Factors Italia SpA, 1999 E.C.R. I-03735.
20
D.L. n.94/1979 (It.).
21
See Steffen Koch, Restructuring: The German Approach, 3 INSOLVENCY &
RESTRUCTURING INT’L, 27, 28 (2009) (analyzing the judiciary-based model, also
with regard to its application in the German system).
22
The Italian Constitutional Court analyzed the compliance of the procedure of
the Law Decree n.26/1979 under the standards of the Italian Constitution. See
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According to the restructuring regulation, only three classes of
actors are authorized to initiate such procedures, including: the
business’ executives; one or more creditors of the enterprise; or the
public prosecutor, ex oficio.23 Once the request to restructure is
received, the Court issues a decision to declare the state of
insolvency. The Court then appoints a judicial committee,
determining whether the management of the enterprise should be
left to the insolvent entrepreneur or entrusted to the latter body –
composed of either one or three commissioners – previously
designated by the Ministry of Economic Development. 24
After declaring a state of insolvency, the Court opens an
observation period, which consists of two different phases: First,
there is a period of 30 days granted to the judicial commission; then,
there is another period of 30 days for the Court to decide whether
the situation is ripe to begin the restructuring plan, based on the
opinion of the Ministry of Economic Development and observations
presented by creditors.25
In its report, the judicial committee indicates the causes of the
state of insolvency and expresses, with reasoned assessment, that
either current conditions support the implementation of a
restructuring plan or do not. The report carries out a prognosis of the
situation and methods for recovering the economic balance of the
business activity. Moreover, the document includes an analysis and
estimate of the corporation’s assets, a list of creditors, and an
Corte Cost., 11 novembre 1987, n. 401; see also Corte Cost., 20 dicembre 1982,
n. 244 (as the Court stated, compliance of the regulation with restructuring plans
is grounded in the rationale of rehabilitation, which is of paramount interest to
all relevant stakeholders, including creditors).
23
Decreto Legislativo 8 luglio 1999, n.270, art. 2, G.U Aug. 9, 1999, n.185 (It.)
(regulating the procedure for invoking restructuring plan in the Italian system).
24
See Giorgio Oppo, Profilo Sistematico dell’Amministrazione Straordinaria
delle Grandi Imprese in Crisi [System Profiles of Restructuring Plans of Large
Corporations in Crisis], in VIRIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE, 233 et seq. (1981)
(discussion about the procedural aspects of the regulation).
25
See Renato Rordorf, Le Procedure Concorsuali e la «Par condicio» fra
Diritto Positivo, Usi Alternativi e Prospettive di Riforma, LA TUTELA DEI
DIRITTI SOGGETTIVI NELLE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, QUADERNI DEL C.S.M.,
n.25, 15 et seq. (1989).
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indication of their respective interests. This preliminary procedure
gives grounds for the Court to formulate its own assessments
regarding the measure to be implemented.26
The Court, after analyzing the report of the judicial committee,
has two options.27 Given suggestions to recover the economic
balance, the Court could start the restructuring plan of the business
entity; otherwise, it could issue a bankruptcy decree.
If the Court decides to establish a restructuring procedure,
then government agencies were authorized to take action. The
Ministry of Economic Development, within five days, appoints an
extraordinary committee composed by one or three
Commissioners,28 typically constituted of the same individuals who
had already served as judicial commissioner.29
In 2003, the Italian parliament passed a reform to the “Prodi”
procedure, moving to an executive-managed model. The so-called
“Marzano” procedure, named after the proposing Minister Antonio
Marzano, established “urgent measures for industrial restructuring
of large enterprises in crisis in order to intervene in a concrete case
of emergency.30 This reform was initiated in response to problems
within the Italian agricultural industry, as swift public intervention
was needed. 31

26

See e.g. Pescucci, supra note 17.
D. Lgs. n. 270/1999, arts. 27–30 (regulating procedural aspects and the role
the Judiciary plays in it, authorizing restructuring plans).
28
Id. art. 38 (regulating the composition and tasks of the extraordinary
committee).
29
See Giorgio Marinucci, La nuova disciplina dell’amministrazione
straordinaria delle grandi imprese in stato di insolvenza [The New Regulation
on Restructuring Plans of Large Corporations in State of Insolvency],
Commentary to D. Lgs. n.270/1999, 299 (Angelo Castagnola & Roberto Sacchi
eds., 2000).
30
Decreto Legge 23 dicembre 2003, n.347, Dec. 24, 2003, G.U. n.298 (It.).
31
See generally Stefano Ambrosini, Fallimento, Soluzioni Negoziate della
Crisi e Disciplina Bancaria dopo le riforme del 2015 e 2016 [Insolvency,
Negotiated Solutions of Crisis and Banking Discipline after 2015 and 2016
Reforms], in STRUMENTI DEL DIRITTO FALLIMENTARE, 779 (A. Signorelli ed.,
2017).
27
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This new model incorporated the need for swift and timely
interventions. Under this reform, executive authorities, following a
request to public authorities, could now autonomously decide
whether the conditions for the restructuring plan are met and how to
deal with the crisis. Shifting away from the prior model, the Italian
parliament designed a relevant role for government to play in such
plan. Under this framework, the Ministry of Economic Development
was entrusted as a third and impartial authority to the manage the
procedure. Indeed, government intervention seemed to better suit
the challenges faced by large corporations, where social and
economic principles are more centrally at stake.32
Under the Marzano reform, judicial administration is set aside
from the procedure for three reasons. First, managing business crises
does not fall under the Italian judiciary’s mandate. Second, the
judiciary lacks the adequate tools for crisis management as the
length of judicial procedures do not correspond well with the need
to achieve a swift resolution and appreciation of social interests, for
which public administration may better serve. Third, only the
government has the instruments to promote industrial restructuring
and conversion processes.33
Pursuant to this new reform on restructuring, state intervention
in crisis management is tailored to the impact that the crisis has in
the public sector. Thus, the greater the impact is, the quicker the
intervention should be. With a reasonable pleading and appropriate
documentation, corporations dealing with financial emergencies
may request the Court for insolvency status and the Ministry of
Economic Development for the immediate admission to the
32
See ROBERTO MARRAFFA, AMMINISTRAZIONE STRAORDINARIA DELLE GRANDI
IMPRESE IN CRISI E TUTELA DEI CREDITORI [RESTRUCTURING PLANS OF LARGE
CORPORATIONS IN CRISIS AND CREDITORS’ PROTECTION] 6–7 (2012) (analyzing

the role of the government in the procedure); see generally Luca Ponti &
Francesca Spadetto, L’amministrazione Straordinaria Delle Grandi Imprese In
Crisi [Restructuring Plans of Large Corporations] (2006) (highlighting the need
for alternative insolvency procedures to bankruptcy for large corporations).
33
See Fabrizio Di Marzo & Francesco Macario, Amministrazione Straordinaria
delle Grandi Imprese in Stato di Insolvenza [Restructuring Plans of Large
Corporations in Insolvency Status], in TRATTATO DELLE PROCEDURE
CONCORSUALI, 601 (A. Jorio, B.N. Sassani eds., 2017).
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restructuring plan. In order to identify the subjects eligible for
restructuring plans, current Italian procedures set out two
requirements based on employment features and patrimonial
structure.34 First, the corporation shall have more than two hundred
subordinate employees for at least one year. Second, it holds total
amount of debts in the amount of two-thirds or more of both total
assets and revenues from sales and services in the previous financial
year. In the case of a holding company, the activation of a
restructuring plan does not extend to the entity’s other companies.
Conditions for access to the restructuring plan for a complete
holding company are determined in the prospects for recovering
economic balance, or the opportunity to successfully manage the
insolvency of the group.35 Nonetheless, once the Ministry of
Economic Development receives a pleading a holding company, it
retains the authority to directly admit the holding company to the
restructuring plan.
Designing the restructuring plan is a task given to the same
committee appointed by the Ministry of Economic Development,
under the supervision of the Ministry itself. This operation must be
tailored to comply with domestic industrial policy guidelines, in
order to safeguard the unity of business entities, while also taking
the interests of creditors into account. Within 60 days from the first
decree, the committee submits a final draft of the restructuring plan
to the Ministry of Economic Development.36 Within 15 days from
the executive decree, the Court declares the insolvency status of the
corporation.
Throughout the execution of the plan, dialogue between the
committee and the Ministry is maintained through regular reports on
the business performance of the corporation submitted every three
34

D.L. n.347/2003, art. 2 (It.) (identifying the subjects eligible for restructuring
plans).
35
See Nicolò Baccetti, Requisiti per l’ammissione [Requirements for
Admission], in LA LEGGE MARZANO, COMMENTARIO, 1–45 (Angelo Castagnola
& Roberto Sacchi eds., 2006) (analyzing the prospects of recovering as a
requirement for the procedure).
36
D.L. n. 347/2003, art. 54 (It.) ((defining the procedural requirements
necessary to issue a restructuring plan).
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months, including a status of implementation of the program.
During this time, the committee is entitled to take control of the
enterprise’s management by administering corporate assets.37
Eventually, at the end of the procedure, a final report indicates
whether the objectives were met, or whether the procedure failed.
If, over the course of the implementation period, the restructuring
plan is found to no longer be effectively applied, the committee can
request the Court to convert the restructuring plan into a bankruptcy
procedure.
C. Case Studies: ILVA and Alitalia
This analysis will now shed light on the state of emergency for
two major Italian corporations, ILVA and Alitalia. Considered to be
economic backbones for the national economic system, these
corporations serve as empirical studies to benchmark the role of
restructuring plans moving forward.
ILVA is a large Italian corporation with a long standing
tradition in the steel sector.38 Founded in 1905, it helped guide Italy
through its industrialization process. Today, the corporation has
more than twelve thousand employees, with its main office in
Taranto. Since 2015, ILVA has been undergoing a restructuring plan
pursuant to the Marzano procedure.39 The plan encompassed the
whole group of ILVA, including subsidiaries in order to reorder and
re-launch the industrial potential of the corporation. In line with the
purpose of the restructuring regime, the plan has three main goals.
First, it aims to safeguard productivity. Since ILVA has a productive
structure with several braches across Italy, the restructuring plan
seems to be a sound strategy for both local prosperity and the
stability of the national economy. Second, it aims to deliver a solid
and reliable result that will ensure business prosperity and
sustainable growth into the future. Third, it seeks to create a strategic
37

Id. art. 40 (delimiting the competence of the committee).
ILVA GROUP, http://www.gruppoilva.com/en (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
39
With the Ministerial Decree of 21 January 2015, ILVA s.p.a. has entered
restructuring plan procedures for shifting corporate management under the
control of an extraordinary committee, pursuant to the Law Decree no. 347,
2003. See Decreto Ministeriale 21 gennaio 2015 pursuant to D.L. n.347/2003.
See also supra IIIA.
38

50

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

role for ILVA, not only at the national level, but also in international
markets, so that it can interact with foreign partners and attract
foreign investors.40
The ILVA restructuring plan resulted in an acquisition
proposal issued by AM Investco Italy, a joint venture represented by
85% ArcelorMittal and 15% Marcegaglia Group. Following the
proposal, and after hearing relevant stakeholders involved in the
process on June 5, 2017, the Ministry of Economic Development
signed a decree to start adjudication for the ILVA industrial
complex.41 The EU Commission is scrutinizing the validity of this
decision under the EU standards on competition law, and it will
presumably issue a decision by October 26, 2017.42
Established in 1947, Alitalia has more than eleven thousand
employees, therefore meeting the requirements to be considered a
large corporation under Italian legislation. The company has been
going through a long-term financial crisis since 2008, spanning two
different regimes of ownership.43 With continued losses in Spring
2017, the corporation attempted to negotiate an agreement for
business recapitalization between the corporate management board
and trade unions. Nonetheless, an internal referendum held on April

40

Extraordinary Administration, ILVA GROUP,
http://www.gruppoilva.com/en/governance/governance/extraordinaryadministration (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
41
See Firmato il decreto di aggiudicazione del complesso industriale del
Gruppo Ilva ad Am Investco Italy, MINISTRY OF ECON. DEV. (Jun. 5, 2017),
http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/index.php/it/per-i-media/comunicatistampa/2036649-calenda-firma-il-decreto-di-aggiudicazione-del-complessoindustriale-del-gruppo-ilva-ad-am-investco-italy.
42
See Matteo Menghello, Ilva, contatti Mittal-Arvedi bussa in vista del verdetto
dell’antitrust europeo, IL SOLE 24 ORE (Sept. 23, 2017)
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/impresa-e-territori/2017-09-23/ilva-arvedibussa-vista-un-no-dell-antitrust-184620.shtml?uuid=AEjYKeYC&refresh_ce=1.
43
Alitalia was first acquired by CAI (Compagnia Aerea Italiana) Group in 2009,
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25, 2017 rejected this agreement.44 As a result of the referendum,
and given the financial distress of the corporation, on May 2, 2017
the board filed a request to the Government for a restructuring
plan.45 The Ministry for Economic Development, pursuant to the
Marzano procedure, appointed an ad hoc committee for the
corporation to carry out interim management.46 Since the
Government excluded a priori in its declarations, the opportunity to
nationalize the company through a public bid process, the committee
has been working on a new plan to reposition the corporation in
domestic and international markets.47
Restructuring plans are necessary for cases like ILVA and
Alitalia, two pillars of the Italian economic system. The
Government’s decision to initiate the plans not only aims to
safeguard corporations amongst the largest in the Italian economy,
but also to avoid systemic economic risk. Considering the scale of
their operations, downward economic and social effects would
impact the country not only at the local level, but also on a national
scale. In this respect, undergoing a restructuring plan with the intent
of attracting FDI may represent a fresh start for these debtors’
business affairs. It is therefore essential that Italy secures a legal and
administrative framework to establish a fertile ground for foreign
investors in respect to these two companies. To this end, the
opportunity for reformation of the current restructuring plan
regulations is particularly timely and necessary.
D. The Opportunity for Reform and Future Scenarios
Italian policymakers are currently discussing a reform on
44
See Giorgio Pogliotti, Referendum Alitalia, vince il «no», IL SOLE 24 ORE
(Apr. 25, 2017) http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-04-24/referendumalitalia-vince-no-230012.shtml.
45
Comunicato Stampa 2 maggio 2017, ALITALIA (May 2, 2017),
http://corporate.alitalia.it/it/media/comunicati-sai/2017-05-02.html.
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Decreto 2 maggio 2017, G.U. May 6, 2017, n.104 (It.) pursuant to D.L. n.
347/2003 (It.).
47
See Giorgio Pogliotti, Alitalia, i Commissari: oltre 600 milioni ancora
disponibili, IL SOLE 24 ORE (Jun. 14, 2017),
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-06-14/alitalia-commissari-oltre600-milioni-ancora-disponibili--173420.shtml?uuid=AEuSnYeB&refresh_ce=1.

52

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

domestic insolvency procedures within the parliament. The Ministry
of Justice’s commission, established in 2015 by executive decree,
was tasked to create proposals for amendments to the current
regulation for insolvency procedures. The Ministry of Justice,
through its relevant subcommittees and in coordination with the
Ministry of Economic Development, aims to provide an organic
framework that harmonizes the judiciary’s needs with
administrative prerogatives in restructuring plans for large
corporations in crisis.48
The reform integrates provisions contained in Legislative
Decree no. 270/1999, or the Prodi procedure, with those embedded
in Law Decree n. 347/2003 and subsequent amendments, or the
Marzano procedure, for possible regulatory improvements.49 Based
on the principle of transparency, these procedures promote
independence and integrity.
The goal is to create a harmonized regulatory framework that
is able to foster the revitalization of troubled businesses and solve
financial crises for Italian corporations. The subject matter of the
reform is limited to large corporations, in order to prevent systemic
risks in the domestic economy.
Reforms to the restructuring regulations include procedural
steps like structural requirements for corporations to be admitted to
a restructuring plan, and the criteria for the appointment of the
extraordinary committee. It harmonizes domestic regulation within
the EU framework to comply with the EU Commission
Recommendation 2003/361/EC set forth on May 6, 2003 which the
defined micro, small, and medium sized enterprises, and also raises
the minimum number of employees for the corporation to be eligible
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See Luciano Panzani, Conservazione dell’impresa, interesse pubblico e tutela
dei creditori: considerazioni a margine della Proposta di direttiva in tema di
armonizzazione delle procedure di ristrutturazione [Conservation of the
Business, of Public Interest and Creditors’ Protection: Considerations as a
Result of the Proposal for a Directive on Harmonization of Restructuring
Procedures], CRISI D’IMPRESA E FALLIMENTO (Sept. 11, 2017),
http://blog.ilcaso.it/libreriaFile/977.pdf.
49
See Del Prete & Smacchi, supra, note 17.
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for the plan from 200 to 250.50 Current quantitative requirements
related to the number of employees and the volume of revenues and
assets, should not be replaced by qualitative parameters related to
the strategic relevance of the corporation within the framework of
the national economic system. In this light, the regulation is
designed to comply with the EU system and, in particular, with the
provisions on competition and state aid.
State aid, pursuant to the meaning of Article 107 (1) of the
Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union, is meant to favor
certain businesses or certain industries. This framework risks
distorting or threatening EU competition while also affecting trade
between Member States.51 As a result, restructuring plans may fall
under the restrictions of state aid regulations, as far as it would allow
a selective advantage to certain corporations or economic sectors to
remain profitable in the market, solely based on a discretionary
provision.52
The current reform is tailored to adjust Italian restructuring
regulation to comply with the the EU framework on competition
law. In order to maintain a balanced economic and social framework
in the domestic system, and in compliance with the EU system, only
cases of relevant downward economic effects of corporate crisis
may public intervention be initiated.
This means that the corporation entrusts the government with
the authority of corporate management. As an impartial actor, the
government is tasked with returning a solid and reliable business
50
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51
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CHALLENGES (Ioannis Lianos & Ioannis Kokkoris eds., 2010) (analyzing EU
competition standards in light of restructuring legal framework in the common
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entity back to the market, cleansed from previous irresponsibility.
On the other hand, it also creates a sound administrative and legal
environment to allow FDI to enter and thrive in the domestic system.
Rather than having a system based on ad hoc laws to provide
urgent solutions to individual cases, the Italian parliament is seeking
to establish an organic legal and administrative framework for
restructuring plans. With an ex ante regulation that is in compliance
with EU competition standards, it will provide an effective and
updated tool to address large corporate crises in the future.
Given the persistence of the financial crisis, Italian
policymakers are essential to prevent large corporate crises from
having a collateral impact on Italian society. These reforms seek to
establish a faster approach to make the current restructuring plan
procedures more transparent and less onerous for the corporations.
CONCLUSION
Since most of the economies affected by the global financial
crisis are struggling in restarting growth, structural and institutional
reforms are key for the achievement of macroeconomic stability.
Restructuring plans have been enacted in economies facing crisis in
order to encourage and protect foreign investments. Some countries,
like Italy and the U.S., have adopted revised foreign investment laws
that offer investors essential guarantees and protections. Based on a
program that not only guarantees business continuity, but also
safeguards employment rates, restructuring plans aim at returning
corporations in crisis to profitability for domestic economic
stability. These plans provide foreign investors with a just and equal
legal regime, as well as continuous protection. Moreover,
restructuring plans are tailored to transform a previously struggling
economic entity into a solid, reliable, and safe entity cleansed from
its previous debts. Consequently, efforts to improve legislation on
foreign investments and current restructuring plans are oriented
toward the creation of a legal regime that is consistent with
international standards on competition and transparency.
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